In this paper, we consider the revenue sharing contract between supply chain actors in a multi-echelon supply chain, where the demand of the customers and retail price are fuzzy variables. The centralized decision making system and a coordinating contract, namely, the revenue sharing contract with fuzzy demand and asymmetric information are proposed. To derive the optimal solutions, the fuzzy set theory is applied for solving these models. Finally, the optimal results of proposed models are illustrated with three numerical experiments. The effects of the fuzziness of retail price and demand, different contract parameters on the optimal strategies for supply chain actors are also analyzed.
Introduction
Over the past ten years, revenue sharing (RS) contract has attracted a lot of attention from both scholars and practitioners, and has achieved much success in film studios and video rental industry. In the revenue sharing contract, the sum of the expected profits of all supply chain actors is the same as the maximum expected profit derived in the centralized decision making system. An adequate number of papers discussed the RS contract in the two-echelon supply chains under a linear or random demand setting. Cachon and Lariviere 1 studied the strengths and limitations of the RS contract. Hou et al. 2 considered a RS and bargaining model in which the profit of the retail was sensitive to the lead time of the manufacturer. Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo 3 developed an agent-based systems model to study the negotiation problem of the RS contract. Chen et al. 4 investigated the problem of channel coordination by using RS contract, where the demands for customers are non-linear functions of the retail price and the size of self-space. Sheu 5 proposed a RS contract to coordinate a supplier-account in the RS contract. Panda 10 used the RS contract to coordinate a socially responsible two stage supply chain with considering two cases, corporate social responsible retailer and corporate social responsibility manufacturer in a linear demand. Hsueh 11 also developed a RS contract embedding corporate social responsibility for coordinating a two-echelon supply chain with random demand. Linh and Hong 12 discussed how to set the wholesale and RS ratio in a two-period model by using the RS contract. Palsule-Desai 13 also studied the coordination problem of the supply chain in a two-period model via revenue-dependent RS contract. In addition, some studies have been done on analyzing competition problems of the supply chain actors in the RS contract. Yao et al. 14 used the RS contract to coordinate the supply chain with two competing retailers and one manufacturer. Pan et al. 15 compared RS contract to wholesale price policy with two manufacturers and one retailer, two retailers and one manufacturer under different channel power structures. Ouardighi and Kim 16 developed a differential game model with wholesale price and RS contracts between two manufacturers and one supplier. Krishnan and Winter 17 studied the coordinating role of RS contract with two competing retailers. Zhang et al. 18 studied the RS contract in a supply chain consisting of two competing retailers with demand disruption. Recently, Chakraborty et al. 19 studied the RS mechanisms with two competing manufacturers and one retailer under a linear stochastic demand. Zhang et al. 20 proposed a RS and cooperative investment contract for deteriorating items to coordinate a supply chain. Arani et al. 21 proposed a novel mixed revenue-sharing option contract for coordinating a retailer-manufacturer supply chain. Some literature focused on the RS contract in a multiechelon supply chain. For example, Giannoccaro and Pontrandolfo 22 studied the RS contract in a three-echelon supply chain. Rhee et al. 23, 24 proposed a spanning RS contract to coordinate a multi-stage supply chain with random demand. Jiang et al. 25 developed a spanning RS contract comprising two competing manufacturers, one distributor and one retailer with a linear demand function in a three-echelon supply chain. Feng et al. 26 studied the RS contract with more than one actor at some echelons in a multi-echelon supply chain. Only a few of articles addressed the RS contract in a fuzzy environment. Wang et al. 27 studied the RS contract with two fuzzy demand forms in a two-stage supply chain. Sang 28 developed a RS contract to coordinate a supply chain with one supplier and multiple retailers in a fuzzy demand environment. All studies mentioned above mainly discussed the RS contract under a linear or probabilistic market demand and known retail price. However, in today's highly competitive market, shorter and shorter product life cycles make the useful statistical data less and less available. Thus, in recent years, fuzzy set theory has been adopted by more and more scholars to solve fuzzy supply chain problems. Zhou et al. 29 As far as we know, there are no studies on the RS contract in a fuzzy multi-stage supply chain. However, in real life, the rapid change of the product life cycle makes the parameters of the supply chain models more and more uncertain. These uncertainties may be the market demand, operations costs of the product, etc. In addition, a supply chain is usually made up more than two stages. Then, a natural question is how to design a coordination mechanism in a multi-stage supply chain. Therefore, in this article, we concentrate on the RS contract in a multistage supply chain, in which the demand, retail price and operational costs are all fuzzy. Furthermore, we discuss the impact of fuzziness for demand and retail price on the RS policy.
The contributions of this article are as follows. Firstly, we extend the works of Sang 28, 30 to a multiple echelon supply chain in a fuzzy demand environment. Secondly, we study the RS contract in an asymmetric information environment in which both the market demand and the retail price are considered as fuzzy variables. Thirdly, we analyze the impacts of the fuzziness of retail price and market demand on the optimal policies in the RS contract.
The reminder of paper is as follows. Some definitions and propositions about fuzzy set theory are introduced in Section 2. Section 3 describes the problem. In Section 4, we develop two fuzzy supply chain models with asymmetric information. In Section 5, three numerical examples are given to illustrate the solutions for proposed models. Section 6 summarizes the work and indicates future work directions. 
Preliminaries
where a, b and c are real numbers with a b c < < . 
where ( )
are the left and right cut sets of ( ) 
, let B  and C  be two positive triangular fuzzy numbers with α cut set
Then we have
Proposition 3 (Liu and Liu 46 ). Let A  be a positive triangular variable with α cut set 
Proposition 4 (Liu and Liu 46 ). Let A  and B  be two independent positive triangular fuzzy variables. If their expected values exist, then for any numbers m and n
Problem Descriptions
Consider a linear supply chain structure with only one actor at each of the 2 n ≥ echelons in a single period setting. Denote the supply chain actor 1 as the most downstream company and actor n as the most upstream company. The supply chain actor 1 sells the product to customer in a high uncertain demand setting. The uncertain demand faced by the supply chain actor 1 is supposed to be a triangular fuzzy number ( ) 
, .
For convenience, the left and right spread functions of the fuzzy demand D  are denoted by ( ) L x and ( ) R x . In the asymmetric information environment, the supply chain actor 1 does not share his complete information of retail price with other actors. Therefore, the retail price will be estimated by the decision makers. Assuming the fuzzy retail price ( )
is considered as a positive triangular fuzzy variable, and denoted by a general membership function (
The supply chain actor i faces the wholesale price Thus, the supply chain actor 1 faces a wholesale price 2 w and fuzzy operational cost 1 c  . Furthermore, actor 1 sells his product to the customers with retail price p, and can choose his order quantity q. Let 1 Π  be the fuzzy profit for supply chain actor 1, i Π  be the fuzzy profit for actor i, 2,3, , i n = 2 , and SC Π  be the fuzzy profit for whole supply chain.
The assumptions related to this paper are given as follows:
Assumption 1(Risk neutral assumption). The supply chain actors are all risk neutral, and they maximize the fuzzy expected profits.
Assumption 2(Positive assumption). We assume [ ]
These ensure that the supply chain actors can obtain their positive fuzzy profits.
Fuzzy Supply Chain Models with Asymmetric Information
In this section, we develop the centralized decisionmaking system and one coordinating contract, namely, RS contract with fuzzy demand and asymmetric information, which can tell the supply chain actors how to make their decisions in a fuzzy environment.
Fuzzy centralized decision-making system with asymmetric information
In the fuzzy centralized decision-making system, all the actors in the supply chain make cooperation, which can be regarded as the supply chain possessed by an integrated decision maker. Then, we can get the fuzzy profit function for supply chain system as
The supply chain actors try to maximize their total fuzzy expected profit by setting the optimal order quantity q. Thus, the fuzzy model solved by the integrated decision maker is given by 
From Eq.(6), the fuzzy expected profit
From Eq.(13), the first order condition of
The second order condition of
Note that the second order condition is negative,
is a concave function with respect to q .
Hence, we can get the optimal order quantity * q by letting the first order condition be zero
Solving Eq. (14), we can get (15)
From Eq. (16), the first order condition of
Note that the second order condition is negative, since ( ) R q is decreasing about q with ' ( ) 0 R q < and ( ) ( )
Hence, we can get the optimal order quantity * q by letting the first order condition be zero [ ] 
There are just the solutions with symmetric information. Proof. Case 1.
[ ] 
( ] 
Theorem 4 is proved.
□
From Eqs. (13), (16) and (18), we can easily derive the optimal fuzzy expected profits for supply chain system as follows 
[ ] ( )
. (23) where 
Fuzzy revenue sharing contract with asymmetric information
In the RS contract, the supply chain actor 1 shares his fuzzy profit with other actor i , The supply chain actor 1 wants to get the order quantity q which maximizes his expected profit
Thus, the optimal objection function of actor 1 is
In the RS contract, we can also get the profit function for supply chain actor i , 2,3, , i n = 2 , as [ ]
Similar to the solution process in Eq. (13), the fuzzy expected profit for supply chain actor 1 can be easily obtained as follows
. (29) From Eq.(31), the first order condition of
 is a concave function with respect to q .
Hence, we can get the optimal order quantity ** q by letting the first order condition be zero
That is
For coordinating this supply chain, ** *= must be hold. This means that the optimal order chosen by supply chain actor 1 in fuzzy RS contract is the same as in fuzzy centralized decision-making system.
Comparing Eq. (31) with Eq. (12), we have
Similar to the solution process in Eq. (13), we can also easily obtain the fuzzy expected profit for supply chain actor i as
From Eq.(32), the first order condition of
For coordinating this supply chain system, ** *= must be hold.
Comparing Eq. (34) 
From Eq. (35), the first order condition of
0
Hence, we can get the optimal order quantity ** q by letting the first order condition be zero 
For coordinating this supply chain, ** *= must be hold.
Comparing Eq. (37) 
From Eq. (38) , the first order condition of
Note that the second order condition is negative, since ( ) R q is decreasing about q with
That is ( ) ( ) [ ]
For coordinating this supply chain system, ** *= must hold. Comparing Eq. (40) 
Proof. Case 1.
Theorem 6 is proved.
□

Numerical Examples
For further elucidating above proposed models, we provide numerical examples in this section. Taking a three-echelon supply chain as an example, Let actor 1, 2 and 3 denotes the retailer, the distributor and the manufacturer, respectively. We discuss the impacts of fuzziness of retail price p  and demand  D , and the values of contract parameters on optimal results in the RS contract.
Discussion 1
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of fuzziness of retail price p  on the optimal results in the RS contract.
The fuzzy demand estimated by the decision maker's experience is supposed to be nearly 300, but not less than 200 and not greater than 400, that is ( ) 9.00 w = .
Since the optimal order quantity * q has two cases, then the other optimal policies and expected profit for supply chain actors in the RS contract can be listed in Tables 1  and 2 . 20 40 0.5 (30, 30, 30) 266.67 1166.67 700.00 466.67 (29, 30, 31) From Tables 1 and 2, we Table 1 are the same in case 2 showed in Table 2 . This is because the fuzzy retail price p  will not affect optimal wholesale prices, and the wholesale prices are impacted only by the operational costs 1 c  , 2 c  and 3 c  .
* q and the expected profits for actors will increase slightly, as the fuzziness of retail price p  increases. This is because an increase in fuzziness of retail price results in an increase in order quantity. This results in the increase of the fuzzy expected profit for the supply chain members. Therefore, in two cases, actors should seek as high fuzziness of retail price p  as possible.
(4) If 1 2 0 ∆ =∆ = , then the results in this paper can reduce to the solutions in the symmetric information environment as showed in the second rows in Tables 1  and 2 . Comparing these solutions, we can find that * q and expected profits for actors in the asymmetric information environment are higher that those in the symmetric information environment. It indicates that all the supply chain actors can benefit from the asymmetric information in a fuzzy environment.
Discussion 2
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of the fuzziness of parameter D  on the RS contract policies. The values of the costs for supply chain actors are considered as before.
From Theorem 5, we can get the optimal wholesale prices in this discussion as * 2 8.00 w = and * 3
9.00 w = .
The other optimal solutions derived are shown in Tables 3and 4. (6) * q and the expected profits for actors will all increase slightly, when the fuzziness of demand D  decreases. That is to say, the manufacturer, distributor and retailer all gain more expected profit when the fuzziness of demand is lower. This is intuitive because the lower the fuzziness of demand, the more efficient of the supply chain system. Therefore, actors should seek as low fuzziness of demand D  as possible.
Discussion 3
In this subsection, we discuss the impact of parameters 2 Φ and 3 Φ on the RS contract policies. The values of the costs for supply chain actors are considered as before.
When the fuzzy retail price ( ) 
